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Political	psychology	focuses	upon	a	diverse	range	of	contexts,	including	leadership,	policy	making,	
nationalism,	racism,	political	extremism,	war,	genocide,	voting,	group	mobilization	and	many	others.	
Given	the	centrality	of	the	social	political	group	in	many	of	these	contexts,	theories	of	intergroup	
relations	have	proven	to	be	very	useful	in	political	psychology	research.	In	attempting	to	elucidate	the	
origins	and	mechanisms	of	discrimination	and	ingroup	favoritism,	the	Polish-born	British	social	
psychologist	Henri	Tajfel,	in	collaboration	with	John	Turner	and	some	other	European	social	
psychologists,	developed	Social	Identity	Theory	(SIT)	in	the	1970s,	which	has	since	become	one	of	the	
most	important	theories	of	intergroup	relations	in	social	and	political	psychology.	As	a	Jewish	
Holocaust	survivor,	Tajfel	had	himself	witnessed	some	of	the	tragic	consequences	of	social	
identification,	ingroup	favoritism	and	outgroup	derogation.	He	returned	to	his	hometown	after	the	
Second	World	War	to	find	that	most	of	his	family	members	had	been	murdered	under	the	Nazi’s	
genocidal	extermination	program	against	the	Jews.	Tajfel	had	personally	experienced	the	process	
whereby	people	cease	to	be	considered	in	terms	of	their	individuality	in	favor	of	their	group	
membership.	In	the	case	of	Jews	in	Nazi-occupied	Europe,	their	categorization		as	Jews,	a	highly	
stigmatized	social	group	membership	in	the	Nazi	ideology,	resulted	in	their	demonization	and	mass	
murder.		
	 The	evolution	of	social	identity	theory	was	part	of	a	larger	movement	in	the	1960s	and	1970s	
to	establish	a	European	social	psychology,	distinct	from	the	social	psychology	of	the	United	States.		
This	was	a	case	of	scholars,	including	Henri	Tajfel,	Serge	Moscovici,	and	Willem	Doise,	launching	a	
research	movement	that	was	political	in	intentions:	establishing	an	alternative	to	what	they	saw	as	
the	‘individualistic’	and	‘reductionist’	social	psychology	of	the	United	States.	In	addition	to	launching	
the	European	Journal	of	Social	Psychology	in	1971,	they	published	a	series	of	books	to	develop	a	
distinct	European	social	psychology,	starting	with	a	kind	of	manifesto	text	entitled	‘The	Context	of	
Social	Psychology’	(1972).	
Henri	Tajfel,	John	Turner,	and	their	associates	set	out	to	develop	a	theory	that	could	explain	
the	processes	that	can	culminate	in	these	extreme	actions.	Although	the	Social	Identity	Approach	is	
often	deployed	as	a	theory	of	identity,	he	intended	to	develop	a	theory	of	intergroup	relations.	The	
theory	was	intended	only	to	explain	one	aspect	of	the	self,	namely	that	part	of	“an	individual’s	self-
concept	which	derives	from	his	knowledge	of	his	[or	her]	membership	of	a	social	group	(or	groups)	
together	with	the	value	and	emotional	significance	attached	to	that	membership”	(Tajfel,	1978,	p.	
63).	Accordingly,	it	goes	without	saying	that	the	Social	Identity	Approach	has	proven	a	very	useful	tool	
for	examining	identification	with	racial,	ethnic	and	national	categories,	given	that	these	are	social	
categories,	as	well	as	intergroup	relations	in	these	contexts.	In	this	entry,	key	tenets	of	SIT	are	
outlined	and	described.	An	additional	aim	of	the	entry	is	to	elucidate	the	potential	contribution	of	SIT	
to	understanding	political	psychological	phenomena,	as	well	as	its	limitations.	
	
What	is	social	identity?	
Much	contemporary	political	psychological	research	into	identity	tends	to	focus	upon	social	identity,	
that	is,	the	group	memberships	that	we	have	and	how	they	come	to	define	us	an	individuals.	A	key	
tenet	of	SIT	is	that	the	world	is	composed	of	various	social	categories	which	differ	in	terms	of	their	
status	and	power.	As	people	come	to	identify	with	these	social	categories,	they	experience	a	cognitive	
re-definition	of	their	sense	of	self	in	terms	of	their	group	memberships,	rather	than	personality	and	
other	individual	traits.	In	short,	this	form	of	self-definition	encourages	the	individual	to	focus	primarily	
upon	their	identity	as	a	group	member,	rather	than	as	a	unique	and	distinctive	individual.	As	one’s	
group	memberships	become	salient,	one	is	motivated	to	engage	intergroup	behavior.	One	begins	to	
see	oneself	and	others	as	members	of	the	ingroup	or	outgroup	and	to	behave	accordingly.		
                                                            
1	rusi.jaspal@cantab.net	
 2 
Political	events	provide	stark	evidence	of	this	process.	In	1947,	as	the	Indian	state	of	Punjab	
was	partitioned	to	create	the	Muslim-majority	independent	nation	state	of	Pakistan,	this	cognitive	
redefinition	of	the	self	in	terms	of	group	memberships	was	seen	in	the	clearest	terms.	It	gave	rise	to	
tragic	outcomes	-	friends	and	neighbors	who	had	formerly	perceived	themselves	and	each	other	as	
residents	of	the	same	village,	who	spoke	the	same	language	and	ate	the	same	food,	suddenly	divided	
themselves	and	each	other	into	dichotomous	religious	categories:	Muslim	or	Hindu/Sikh.	Friend	
became	foe	because	of	this	cognitive	redefinition.	Fellow	villagers	became	religious	and	national	
outgroups.	The	communal	intergroup	violence	that	accompanied	the	1947	Partition	resulted	in	
approximately	1,000,000	deaths.	
	
Social	identity	processes	
In	seeking	to	describe	and	theorize	the	social	and	psychological	processes	that	underpin	political	
events	and	behaviors	of	this	kind,	Tajfel	and	his	colleagues	developed	SIT,	which	has	been	elaborately	
discussed	elsewhere	(Brown,	2000;	Pehrson	and	Reicher,	2014).	However,	in	outlining	the	theory,	it	is	
useful	to	point	to	two	key	processes:	social	categorization	and	social	comparison.		
Social	categorization	is	essentially	cognitive	process	that	enables	the	individual	to	simplify	
the	social	world	by	slotting	social	stimuli	(including	themselves	and	others)	into	categories.	The	
individual	is,	thus,	able	to	order	the	social	environment	and	anticipate	patterns	of	action	and	behavior	
in	interactions	with	these	stimuli.	For	instance,	in	work	on	antisemitism	in	Iran,	it	has	been	found	that	
in	circumstances	where	Iranian	Jews	are	categorized	by	Iranian	Muslims	as	fellow	Iranians	(that	is,	in	
terms	of	their	national	identity)	they	perceived	a	greater	sense	of	belonging,	acceptance	and	inclusion	
than	when	their	Jewish	identity	is	rendered	salient	(Jaspal,	2016).	This	can	be	attributed	to	the	fact	
that	people	attenuate	differences	between	stimuli	within	the	same	category	(referred	to	as	
“accentuation”)	and	that	they	accentuate	differences	between	stimuli	in	different	categories	(that	is	
“contrast”).	Thus,	the	Iranian	Muslim	who	perceives	Iranian	Jews	first	and	foremost	as	fellow	Iranians	
will	regard	fewer	differences	between	himself	and	Iranian	Jews,	whereas	the	Iranian	Muslim	who	
perceives	Jewish	co-nationals	in	terms	of	their	Jewish	religious	identity	will	perceive	Iranian	Jews	as	
different	from	himself.		
There	are	a	series	of	factors	that	can	determine	how	we	categorize	social	stimuli	and	indeed	
other	people.	Political	rhetoric,	individual	motivations,	social	representations	and	ideology	are	just	
some	of	the	determinants	of	this	social	psychological	process.	This	highlights	the	important	role	of	
social	representations,	consisting	of	norms,	values,	images	and	ideologies,	in	social	identity	formation	
(Breakwell,	1986).	A	promising	area	of	research	that	draws	upon	SIT	specifies	some	of	the	ways	in	
which	individuals	might	come	to	categorize	themselves	and	others	in	sufficiently	inclusive	terms	so	
that	they	can	construct	a	high-level	superordinate	identity	–	the	Common	Ingroup	Identity	Model	
suggests	that	higher-level	categorization	can	reduce	intergroup	tensions	(e.g.	Gaertner	&	Dovidio,	
2000).	
Social	comparison	enables	the	individual	to	evaluate	categories	that	emerge	from	the	social	
categorization	process.	Crucially,	the	knowledge	that	people	derive	concerning	these	categories	is	
socially	determined	-	it	is	contingent	upon	the	frame	of	reference	one	employs.	As	we	begin	to	
categorize	ourselves	primarily	as	group	members,	our	own	sense	of	self	becomes	entwined	with,	and	
dependent	upon,	the	fate	of	our	group	as	a	whole.	When	our	group	excels,	we	feel	good	about	
ourselves.	When	it	does	badly,		this	has	a	negative	effect	on	us	personally.	Typically,	the	individual	is	
motivated	to	evaluate	their	own	ingroup	more	positively	than	outgroups	as	this	provides	feelings	of	
self-esteem.	It	is,	however,	acknowledged	that	self-esteem	is	not	the	only	motivational	force	in	social	
comparison	(Hogg	&	Abrams,	1988).	The	downward	comparison	principle,	which	is	derived	from	SIT,	
suggests	that	individuals	compare	their	ingroup	with	outgroups	on	dimensions	in	which	they	will	
perform	favorably.	For	instance,	in	recent	research	into	caste	identity	among	Indians	(Jaspal	&	Takhar,	
2016),	it	was	found	that	members	of	traditionally	“lower”	caste	groups	often	accentuated	tenets	of	
their	caste	group	that	could	differentiate	it	positively	from	groups	traditionally	regarded	as	being	
“higher”	in	the	caste	hierarchy.	In	political	contexts,	human	beings	are	thus	motivated	to	attenuate	
negative	aspects	of	their	ingroup’s	history,	which	has	been	starkly	demonstrated	in	contexts	of	
national	guilt	surrounding	ingroup	atrocities,	for	instance	(Branscombe	&	Doosje,	2004).	
In	addition	to	self-esteem,	the	need	for	intergroup	distinctiveness	is	an	important	principle	
of	SIT.	Studies	have	shown	that	people	engage	in	intergroup	behaviour	in	order	to	establish	a	sense	of	
positive	distinctiveness	within	the	context	of	their	intergroup	comparison	(Tajfel	&	Turner,	1979).	In	
SIT,	it	is	often	suggested	that	the	need	for	distinctiveness	is	entwined	with	the	drive	for	self-esteem	
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since	it	is	positive	distinctiveness	that	one	seeks.	Research	into	the	distinctiveness	principle	has	
recognized	that	it	can	be	construed	on	both	individual	and	group	levels	(Vignoles,	Chryssochoou	&	
Breakwell,	2000).	In	collectivist	societies,	in	particular,	distinctiveness	may	be	derived	from	perceived	
difference	and	separateness	on	the	basis	of	one’s	group	membership	(that	is,	in	opposition	to	
outgroups).	It	is	also	true	that	one’s	group	membership(s)	can	contribute	to	the	individual’s	sense	of	
personal	distinctiveness	vis-à-vis	other	individuals	who	may	not	share	these	particular	group	
memberships.	For	instance,	the	Jewish	theological	belief	that	Jews	were	chosen	to	be	in	a	covenant	
with	God	may	plausibly	contribute	to	the	perception	that	this	“special”	group	membership	provides	a	
sense	of	distinctiveness.	
The	two	processes	interact	to	create	social	identification	and,	thus,	intergroup	behavior.	
Categorization	is	conducive	to	the	perception	of	oneself	and	others	in	terms	of	group-level	
stereotypes,	while	comparison	enables	individuals	to	derive	positive	distinctiveness	by	accentuating	
differences	between	our	ingroup	and	relevant	outgroups.	Intergroup	behavior	varies	in	accordance	
with	time	and	context,	as	change	is	inevitable	and	inherent	to	every	socio-political	system.	
	
Social	identity	and	socio-political	change	
Theories	of	intergroup	behavior,	including	SIT,	often	acknowledge	that	groups	are	not	all	evaluated	in	
equal	terms.	Some	are	regarded	as	“high-status”	while	others	are	relegated	to	lower	positions	in	the	
social	hierarchy.	Caste	constitutes	an	excellent	example	of	how	groups	within	a	social	system	differ	in	
terms	of	their	social	status.	Given	the	motivation	that	individuals	have	to	feel	good	about	their	groups	
and,	thus,	themselves,	it	is	logical	that	they	should	wish	to	create	an	improvement	in	the	status	quo.	
SIT	elaborates	its	explanation	of	how	individuals	seek	to	cope	with	low	group	status	by	focusing	on	
the	belief	systems	that	are	held	and	indeed	promoted	ideologically.	More	specifically,	the	theory	
refers	to	the	social	mobility	belief	system	and	the	social	creativity	belief	system.	
	 In	some	cases,	individuals	perceive	group	boundaries	to	be	permeable,	that	is,	they	believe	
that	their	group	membership	is	not	fixed	and	can	therefore	be	abandoned.	Consequently,	members	
of	low-status	groups	may	decide	to	leave	their	group	and	to	join	a	higher-status	one,	thereby	
obviating	the	need	to	personalize	to	the	individual	self	the	poor	status	of	the	group.	Indeed,	this	is	
observable	in	cases	of	social	class	mobility	–	a	working-class	individual	may	decide	to	go	to	university,	
secure	professional	employment,	move	to	an	affluent	area,	and	begin	to	self-identify	as	middle	class.	
Moreover,	he	or	she	may	actively	disidentify	with	former	ingroup	members,	that	is,	other	working	
class	individuals.	Similarly,	in	social	psychological	research	into	the	identities	of	British	Muslim	gay	
men	(Jaspal	&	Cinnirella,	2010)	it	has	been	found	that	some	men	may	face	immeasurable	conflict	
from	their	Muslim	ingroup	and	animosity	from	other	gay	men	due	to	the	perceived	incompatibility	of	
Islam	and	gay	identity.	In	such	cases,	the	individual	may	simply	abandon	his	Muslim	identity	to	reduce	
conflict	and	to	escape	the	social	stigma	of	religiosity	in	a	context	that	is	deemed	important,	that	is,	
among	other	(secular)	gay	men.		
	 However,	some	groups	are	simply	not	perceived	to	be	permeable	at	all	and	exit	is	therefore	
not	an	option.	We	are	often	led	to	believe	that	“race”	is	a	fixed,	biological	category	that	cannot	be	
changed,	and	that	we	cannot	go	from	being	Black	to	White,	for	instance.	In	the	contexts	of	
impermeable	group	boundaries,	members	of	low-status	groups	may	decide	to	re-construe	the	social	
meanings	of	their	group	membershp.	Earlier	in	this	entry,	the	example	of	downward	comparison	was	
outlined	in	relation	to	the	Indian	caste	system	–	some	individuals	will	simply	compare	their	groups	to	
outgroups	that	are	even	more	disadvantaged	than	their	own,	or	focus	on	dimensions	on	which	their	
ingroup	outperforms	an	outgroup	regardless	of	their	overall	social	status.	Moreover,	some	individuals	
will	challenge	the	status	quo	in	a	form	of	“negativism”,	that	is,	they	may	decide	to	actively	oppose	
social	norms	and	ideologies.	A	classic	example	of	this	is	the	“Black	is	Beautiful”	movement	that	
emerged	in	the	1960s	as	a	means	of	re-defining	Black	identity	in	the	US	as	something	to	be	proud	of,	
rather	than	ashamed	of.	Similarly,	Philogène	(2001)	has	described	how	the	category	“African	
American”	has	facilitated	a	re-definition	of	the	meanings	of	being	Black	in	the	US	in	that	the	group	
membership	is	less	racialized	and	culturally	defined.	Moreover,	the	political	mobilization	of	
traditionally	lower-caste	groups	in	India	has,	in	some	cases,	resulted	in	a	re-definition	of	their	caste	
identity	as	a	symbol	of	political	power,	rather	than	subjugation.	
	
Concluding	thoughts	
SIT	has	made	an	immensely	important	contribution	to	the	social	psychology	of	intergroup	relations	
and	remains	the	basis	for	several	theories	of	intergroup	relations	that	have	followed,	such	as	self-
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categorization	theory.		SIT	remains	the	only	modern	European	theory	to	have	has	wide	impact	on	
social	psychology	in	North	America.	The	theory	elegantly	describes	the	social	psychological	processes	
that	lead	us	to	view	ourselves	and	others	primarily	in	terms	of	group	membership.	However,	SIT	is	
often	erroneously	regarded	as	a	theory	of	identity.	It	constitutes	a	useful	theoretical	tool	for	
examining	group	processes	in	political	psychology	but	it	provides	less	insight	into	the	complex	
interactions	between	individual,	interpersonal	and	intergroup	levels	of	analysis	which	contribute	to	
human	identity	in	political	contexts	(Breakwell,	1986).	One	of	the	greatest	promises	of	SIT	is	in	
understanding	social	and	political	change,	which	are	also	key	concerns	for	the	political	psychologist.	
While	this	tenet	of	SIT	has	led	to	some	fruitful	and	stimulating	debates	about	social	change	and	
intergroup	relations	(de	la	Sablonnière	&	Usborne,	2014),	it	remains	unclear	in	SIT	how	social	identity	
itself	can	act	as	a	catalyst	for	social	and	political	change.	A	more	explicit	integration	of	SIT	with	other	
theories	of	identity	and	indeed	of	group	power	would	be	fruitful	for	the	field	of	political	psychology.	
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